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ARGUMENT 
The brief of Plaintiffs and Appellees S&W Construction 
Company ("S&W") and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company ("Fireman's 
Fund") ("Plaintiffs") demonstrates that the trial court's award 
of $377,310.00 to Plaintiffs should be reversed. The only 
support for the award offered by their brief consists of two 
fictitious agreements never found to exist even by the trial 
court itself. 
Under the construction contract between S&W and 
Defendant and Appellant Cyprus-Thompson Creek Mining Company 
("Cyprus-Thompson Creek"), the amount that should be awarded to 
Plaintiffs for S&W' s predefault work is $129, 957. 73. No 
prejudgment interest should be awarded on this amount, and none 
should have been included in the original judgment because the 
, parties were never able to calculate the underlying amounts with 
any precision. 
There is no legal or equitable justification for the 
trial court' s award of post-judgment interest at the Idaho 
statutory rate of eighteen percent. The judgment should bear 
interest at the Utah statutory rate of twelve percent. 
1. P l a i n t i f f s ' b r i e f demonstrates that, t h e Judgment 
parfl nf 6377 .310 t o fi&W was nnt supported bv t h e n n n s t r u c t i o n 
Qntract* 
Plaintiffs seek to support the trial court' s award of 
377, 310. 00 to S&W based upon an agreement which did not exist. 
'he nature and terms of this supposed agreement are stated on 
>age 21 of their brief: 
. . . an agreement was reached whereby 
S&W delegated its duties and transferred it 
[sic] subcontracts to Fireman's Fund. This 
left the S&W contract in place and kept the 
network of subcontractors on the job. 
This assertion of a "delegation agreement" by S&W is 
erroneous for the following reasons: 
1. No such agreement ever existed, and none was found 
to exist by the trial court; 
2. The clear contract language governing S&W' s rights 
upon its default contradicts any such supposed delegation 
agreement. % 
The delegation agreement theory as found in Plaintiffs' 
brief is an invention. The trial court clearly found no such 
agreement; it is not even referred to in any of the thirty-one 
findings of fact and five conclusions of law entered by the trial 
court. (See Addendum F to Appellants' Brief). 
This supposed "delegation agreement" also ignores and 
contradicts the clear contract language which would otherwise 
govern any recovery for S&W after its default. That language is 
found in Section 43. 3 of the Contract Agreement (Addendum I to 
Appellants' Brief) between S&W and Cyprus-Thompson Creek, where 
S&W' s recovery is clearly and explicitly limited to work done 
prior to the default: 
In the event of any such default, 
defect, delay, bankruptcy, or insolvency, 
CONTRACTOR shall not be entitled to any 
further payment until the matter is remedied 
to the satisfaction of COMPANY and then shall 
be paid only such amount as is reasonably due 
for WORK properly done by CONTRACTOR . . . . 
In an apparent attempt to avoid the clear import of 
this language, Plaintiffs substitute their theory of a delegation 
agreement. To support this theory, they suggest obliquely that 
the delegation agreement is supported by the fact that Cyprus -
Thompson Creek never terminated its contract with S&W. While it 
is true that Cyprus-Thompson Creek never terminated the contract, 
this fact is irrelevant. The language of Section 43. 3 says 
nothing about limiting S&W' s recovery to payment for work done 
prior to contract termination. In fact, the contract provisions 
upon which Plaintiffs rely to support their argument that 
termination is somehow relevant to this case undercut their 
argument. Sections 43.1 and 43.2 give Cyprus-Thompson Creek 
arious options in the event of S&W's default. Cyprus-Thompson 
reek could terminate the contract if it so chooses. It could 
lso proceed in other, alternate ways to remedy the default. 
owever, Section 43. 3 makes clear that S&W' s recovery is limited 
o payment for work it did prior to its default, regardless of 
.he remedy elected by Cyprus-Thompson Creek. Since S&W did no 
rork after default, it is entitled to no recovery beyond payment 
:or its predefault work. 
The theory of a delegation agreement also ignores the 
:lear undisputed evidence at trial. All parties agree that, upon 
5&W' s default, the critical concern was insuring continuity of 
the construction work on the project. The key consideration in 
insuring such continuity was to keep the subcontractors working 
on the job. To do so, Cyprus-Thompson Creek and its contract 
manager, Morrison-Knudsen, hired S&W supervisory personnel who 
had been .terminated by S&W because of the bankruptcy. The 
paperwork, including the administration of the various 
subcontractors, was done in a way as to avoid any disruption of 
the work because of S&W' s default. None of these facts are 
disputed. See, e. a. , Brief of Appellees' at 21. However--and 
this is the important point—this effort to insure construction 
continuity did not result in any agreement by any party to the 
substitution of another contractor for S&W or to the delegation 
of any of S&W s contractual duties. Because the only possible 
support for the trial court7 s award to S&W is this non-existent 
agreement, the award should be reversed. 
2. Plaintiffs' brief, and the table of calculations 
included therein, demonstrate that the proper amount of an award 
to S&W for work done prior to default is £129,957,73-
Defendants and Appellants Cyprus-Thompson Creek Mining 
Company and Cyprus Minerals Company ("Cyprus") submit that 
$129,957.73 is the proper amount to be awarded to S&W for the 
work it did prior to its default. Plaintiffs assert that 
$295,079.73 represents the correct figure for the value of work 
done prior to default, though this is not the amount they are 
seeking to recover. The trial court agreed with this figure in 
its Finding of Fact No. 27. (Addendum F to Appellants' Brief). 
The $295,079.73 figure is derived by deducting 
$1,162,921.00, the amount all parties agree Cyprus-Thompson Creek 
paid to S&W subcontractors and suppliers after default, from the 
sum of $1,458,000.73, the total of progress payment estimates 
submitted by S&W but not paid prior to its default. 
Cyprus submits that $165,122.00 should be deducted from 
the $1,458,000.73 claimed by S&W on the progress payment 
estimates before deduction of the $1,162,921.00 figure for 
amounts paid to S&W subcontractors by Cyprus-Thompson Creek after 
*fault. Since the $165,122, 00 represents work not actually done 
{ S&W prior to default, this amount should be deducted from the 
rogress payment estimates' total. 
To understand this conclusion, it is necessary to 
nderstand precisely what the $165, 122. 00 figure represents, 
hat figure was included in the progress payment estimates under 
category called "material advances." Cyprus-Thompson Creek 
ave material advances to S&W for work which had not yet been 
one; advances were paid to insure that S&W had adequate funds to 
>ay for equipment which needed to be ordered in advance and 
iabricated to specification. The $165,122.00 was for specialized 
leating and air conditioning equipment being supplied by an S&W 
subcontractor, McGee Heating & Air Conditioning. 
The testimony by all parties at trial was clear and 
undisputed. S&W claimed credit for this $165,122.00 in the 
progress payment estimates totalling $1,458,000. 77. S&W did not, 
however, pay this amount; Cyprus did after default. 
At page 30 of their brief, Plaintiffs set forth a table 
which purports to demonstrate that the deduction of the 
$165,122.00 is irrelevant to the computation of the correct 
amount to be awarded to S&W for work done prior to default. That 
table shows: 
Prg-flgfowlt Profits gre-flefovlt Profits 
Including Units pyclyiflinq Pnjt? 
Amount Earned: $1,458,000.73 $1,292,878.73 
Less S&W 
Obligations 
Due Subs and 
Suppliers at 
Insolvency: 
1, 1», 9?l,QQ 997.799.00 
Pre-Insolvency 
Profit: $ 295,079.73 $ 295,079.73 
The first problem with the table is that it purports to 
show the "profits" earned by S&W. Profits are irrelevant. 
Section 43. 3 of the contract does not grant S&W any right to 
recover profits for work done prior to default. Under Section 
4 3. 3, S&W is only entitled to recover the value of the work it 
actually did prior to default. 
There are five separate numbers shown in the table. 
The first is $1,458,000.73. This amount is labeled as "Amount 
Earned." This label is incorrect. This number actually 
represents the total of the unpaid progress payment estimates at 
the time of default. The next number to the right of 
$1,292,878.73 represents the progress payment estimates' total of 
$1,458,000.73 minus $165,122.00 in material advances. This 
number is correct in the sense that it represents the total 
amount due for work actually done by S&W and its subcontractors 
rior to default. This number is, however, incorrectly labeled 
3 "Amount Earned. " This label is wrong again because of the 
Bxt figure in the left column of the table; that figure is 
1,162,921.00, the amount Cyprus-Thompson Creek paid S&W s 
ubcontractors and suppliers after default. Obviously, any 
mounts paid by Cyprus-Thompson Creek for S&W obligations must be 
educted to obtain the "amount earned" by S&W. The $1,162,921.00 
igure is the correct amount for the S&W obligations Cyprus-
'hompson Creek paid. 
The next figure to the right is $997, 799. 00; it is 
.ncorrect. This figure is wrong because the assumption upon 
/hich the table is premised is also wrong. The table is only a 
:ortuous attempt to demonstrate an otherwise simple proposition; 
$165,122.00 should not be deducted from the amount claimed as due 
for work done at the time of default. The argument to support 
this proposition is premised on a faulty conclusion summarized on 
page 29 of Plaintiffs' brief as follows: 
Robs on [Fireman's Fund's expert witness] 
testified that the subcontracts required S&W 
to pay suppliers and subcontractors only 
after payment from Cyprus. . . . Thus, the 
question of when to account for the units is 
a fictitious issue. 
The issue is not one of accounting for payments made to 
subcontractors and suppliers. The issue is a legal question of 
S&W' s entitlement to payment under the contract language. The 
timing of payment for the equipment represented by the material 
advances is not a "fictitious issue," because the clear language 
of Section 43. 3 which determines S&W s right to any payment 
following default states that any such payment is limited to work 
properly done by S&W prior to that default. Thus, S&W s 
entitlement to any monies depends upon work which it actually did 
prior to the time it walked off the project in May of 1983. 
Under this contract language, the correct computation 
is as follows: $165,122.00 should be deducted from 1,458,000.73. 
This deduction should be made because the advance was only a 
credit given on the progress payment estimate for work to be done 
in the future. This deduction yields $1,292,878*73, a figure 
representing the actual value of the work completed at the time 
of default. From this figure should be subtracted the 
$1,162,921.00 which represents the amount of S&W s obligations 
paid by Cyprus-Thompson Creek. The resulting figure is 
$129,957. 73, the amount still due to S&W under Section 43. 3 for 
le value of the work it had performed at the time of default. l 
tius, S&W is not entitled to recover any more than $129, 957. 73 
or its work prior to default. 
3. Plaintiff a' brief demonstrate that the award of 
377.310 to Fireman' s Fund was based on an agyeetnftnt which did 
Qt exist 
At page 35 of their brief, Plaintiffs assert the 
ollowing contract: 
The effect of this correspondence was 
the formation of a contract between S&W and 
Fireman's Fund. The letter of June 24, 1983 
from Fireman' s Fund to Cyprus constitutes an 
offer. The letter of June 29, 1983 from 
Cyprus constitutes a counteroffer which was 
accepted by Fireman' s Fund. Cyprus' response 
set forth in its "Item (i)" is most 
reasonably construed as a proposal to pay all 
excess contract funds to Fireman' s Fund upon 
lWhen properly calculated according to the contract language, 
Plaintiffs' table should read: 
Amount of Progress Payment Estimates $1,458,000.73 
Less: Deduction for Material Advances 
Credited Before Work was Done 165,122.00 
Subtotal 1, 292, 878. 73 
Less: S&W Obligations Paid by Cyprus-
Thompson Creek After Default 1,162,921.00 
Total Amount Earned by S&W 
Prior to Default 129, 957. 73 
counsel' s advice that such an arrangement is 
legally possible. Fireman' s Fund accepted 
this term in its letter of August 12, 1983. 
Plaintiffs assert that there was an agreement, 
contained in three letters, two in June and one in August of 
1983. Presumably, the effect of this alleged agreement was to 
bind Cyprus-Thompson Creek to pay any excess contract funds to 
Fireman' s Fund. 
There was simply no agreement of the kind now advanced 
by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs acknowledge this fact. They admit at 
pages 33 through 36 of their brief that Cyprus-Thompson Creek and 
Fireman' s Fund never agreed to a proposal that Fireman' s Fund be 
obligated to pay amounts in excess of the bond limit. Fireman' s 
Fund dismisses this problem with the statement, "The bond limit 
was only an issue if costs overruns exceeded the bond limit. " 
Brief of Appellees at 36. This statement is a concession that no 
agreement was ever reached on the point. The concession is 
explained away by the irrelevant and unsupported legal assertion 
that the eventuality which the disputed point was supposed to 
cover never occurred. 
There was, however, another term on which no agreement 
was reached, and this term is rather disingenuously omitted from 
Plaintiffs' argument. Cyprus-Thompson Creek proposed, as a 
further condition to any agreement to pay the contract balances, 
-11 -
lat Fireman' s Fund give it a hold harmless agreement to protect 
fprus-Thompson Creek in the event of third party claims to the 
irplus funds. Fireman' s Fund never agreed to this point. 
The omission of this point from Plaintiffs' argument is 
•trticularly noteworthy because in June of 1984, Fireman' s Fund, 
tirough its present counsel, sent a letter to Cyprus-Thompson 
reek demanding the contract surplus and offering a hold harmless 
greement. This letter was admitted as Exhibit 38-P at trial, 
nd is attached as Addendum A to this reply brief. Obviously, 
his letter came long after completion of the work and long after 
ny supposed agreement arose from correspondence in June and 
ugust of 1983. 
Again, it should be noted that in its rather lengthy 
.nd often detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the 
:rial court did not find any such agreement. (See Addendum F to 
appellants' Brief). 
Plaintiffs also seem to argue that under an equitable 
:heory of subrogation, Fireman' s Fund is entitled to the surplus 
contract balance. However, as is revealed at page 36 of their 
Drief, this argument is also premised upon the supposed agreement 
that Cyprus-Thompson Creek would pay the contract surplus to 
Fireman' s Fund. 
As stated, this agreement simply did not exist. As 
noted above, neither the findings of fact nor the conclusions of 
law entered by the trial court support the existence of this 
claimed agreement. The findings of fact do, however, suggest a 
serious failure in Plaintiffs' case, a failure which may explain 
Plaintiffs' need to invoke a non-existent agreement. Finding of 
Fact No. 4 (Addendum F to Appellants' Brief) states Fireman' s 
Fund' s obligations under the performance bond upon the default of 
S&W. 
4. The performance bond required 
Fireman' s Fund, upon default by S&W, to 
promptly: 
1. Complete the contract in 
accordance with the terms of the 
contract, or 
2. Obtain bids for completing the 
contract in accordance with the said 
terms and conditions of the contract and 
make available sufficient funds to pay 
for such completion. 
Fireman' s Fund performed neither of the alternatives 
set forth in Finding of Fact No. 4. It did not hire a substitute 
contractor nor did it complete the work. It did not pay the 
expenses of completing the job; Cyprus did. Neither at trial nor 
in their brief have Plaintiffs made any attempt to argue that 
Fireman' s Fund followed either of these alternatives. Since 
Fireman' s Fund did not perform in accordance with the terms of 
-13-
:s bond, Plaintiffs must resort to a non-existent contract to 
xpport the asserted obligation of Cyprus-Thompson Creek to pay 
le contract balance to Fireman' s Fund. Because the trial 
>urt' s award to Fireman' s Fund can only be based on this non-
cistent agreement, it should be reversed. 
4. Contrary to the mlscharacterization of its 
raument in Plaintiffs' brief. Cyprus seeks reversal of the pre-
ndyment interest award because the underlying judgment amount 
as not mathematically ascertainable. 
Plaintiffs misstate Cyprus1 argument on this point; 
yprus does not seek reversal of the prejudgment interest award 
ecause the amount of damages was disputed. It seeks reversal of 
he award because the parties were never able to calculate a 
recise amount. £$& Insurance Assoc. Corp. v. Hansen, 116 Idaho 
48, 782 P.2d 1230, 1233 (1989). 
The present case is distinguishable in several 
.mportant* respects from the case relied on most heavily by 
>laintiffs, Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 506 P. 2d 455 
[1972). First, there is no indication that the parties in 
4itchell had any difficulty in ascertaining the amount due under 
:he contracts. Second, the judgment in Mitchell was not based on 
a stipulated amount. Third, the contractor in Mitchell did not 
iefault. Fourth, there is no indication that a contract 
-14-
provision at all similar to Section 43. 3 governed the amount due 
in Mitchell.2 The amount of damages was stipulated in the 
present case because that amount was not otherwise calculable. 
This crucial fact is not altered by Plaintiffs' explanations for 
the stipulation; their explanations are irrelevant and 
implausible. Plaintiffs' claim that the stipulation could have 
been reached earlier through timely discussions is meaningless. 
An earlier stipulation would still be a stipulation. Plaintiffs' 
suggestion that they lacked the documents needed to calculate the 
amount due is implausible given their claims of intimate 
involvement in the completion of the contract work and their 
claims of accuracy for their various calculations. Even more 
implausible is Plaintiffs' assertion that they stipulated to 
Cyprus' figure only because it would be more economical to forego 
their claim for an additional $20,000 than to offer a few change 
orders as evidence at trial. Because the underlying amount was 
not ascertainable with any precision, the trial court' s award of 
prejudgment interest should be reversed. 
2Section 43.3 provides for payment of "only such amount as is 
reasonably due for WORK properly done by CONTRACTOR. " It does not 
provide a liquidated sum as did the contracts in Mitchell. 
-1 q_ 
5. The contract' s choice of law provision does not 
Btifv the trial court's award of post-iudpment interest at the 
Bho rate of eighteen percent. 
As all parties to this appeal have agreed, the 
ndatory rate of post-judgment interest set by section 15-1-4 of 
e Utah Code applies to all judgments rendered by Utah courts, 
less the parties to the contract have agreed on another rate, 
aintiffs suggest at pages 46 through 49 of their brief that the 
rial court' s award should stand because the parties did agree on 
le Idaho statutory rate. 3 The only contract provision cited in 
lpport of this theory is Section 38. 1. 7, a general choice of law 
rovision that makes no reference to interest. 
Section 38. 1. 7 was not and cannot be considered an 
jreement on the applicable post-judgment interest rate. Such 
rovisions are understood to refer only to the substantive law 
overning the merits of disputes under the contract. 3 National 
nstitute of Construction Law, Construction & Design Law § 35. 2, 
t 3 (1984)("In general, a choice of law provision will not 
ffect the procedural aspects of a case, which remain subject to 
3Plaintiffs have also noted that a Utah trial court may under 
jertain circumstances impose an interest rate higher than the 
statutory rate for equitable reasons. However, Plaintiffs have 
>ffered no equitable reason for imposing a higher rate in this 
:ase. Absent an equitable reason or a legal reason, i.e., a 
:ontract provision specifying a higher rate of interest, there is 
10 basis for the trial court' s post-judgment interest award. 
the law of the forum."); S^ars. Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assoc, , 
Inc. , 43 N. Y. 2d 389, 372 N. E. 2d 555, 559, 401 N. Y. S. 2d 767 
(1977)("The contract provision that the agreement was to be 
governed by Michigan law operated only to import the substantive 
law of Michigan."). Under this rule, the meaning of Section 
38. 1. 7 is not at all ambiguous; in accordance with the 
established rule, it states the parties' choice of substantive 
law only. 
Although Plaintiffs would like this Court to classify 
post-judgment interest as substantive, they have failed to offer 
a single policy reason for doing so. They have also failed to 
cite even one instance of another court' s having adopted their 
position. Instead, they have quoted Transpower Constructors v. 
Grand River Dam Auth. . to the effect that post-judgment interest 
11
 fait best, . . . is x " in the uncertain area between substance 
and procedure"' and, therefore, *"rationally capable of 
classification as either."'" 905 F. 2d 1413, 1424 (10th Cir. 
1990)(emphasis added)(citations omitted). In quoting this 
portion of the case, Plaintiffs have chosen to ignore the court' s 
holding: "We disagree with [defendant's] characterization of 
[post-judgment] interest on fees as substantive. . . . we 
conclude that . . . the imposition of [post-judgment] interest on 
fees is a procedural matter. " Ifl. Absent any legal authority or 
_ 1 T_ 
>licy reason for classifying post-judgment interest as 
ibstantive, this Court should follow the reasoning of the courts 
lat have already considered this issue and have determined that 
:>st-judgment interest should be classified as procedure. 
Just as Section 38. 1. 7 could not justify the use of 
laho' s civil procedure rules in a Utah court, it cannot justify 
tie application of Idaho' s post-judgment interest rate to a Utah 
udgment. 4 Any other conclusion would be manifestly unfair. It 
ould simply provide a windfall to Plaintiffs that was never 
ontemplated by the parties to the contract. Given the rule that 
irovisions such as Section 38. 1. 7 state the parties' choice of 
ubstantive law only and given the case law establishing that 
>ost-judgment interest is a procedural matter, there is no basis 
for concluding that Section 38. 1. 7 was intended to provide for 
jost-judgment interest at the Idaho rate. Therefore, the trial 
sourt' s imposition of post-judgment interest at the rate of 
eighteen percent should be reversed. 
se^ Ajrgp, inc, 2L Hprxspp Cftrgp Transport, tnct * 66 Haw-
590, 670 P. 2d 1277, 1281 (1983)(supreme court reversed trial 
court' s award of prei udament interest based on Hawaii law because 
contract provided that Texas law governed, but supreme court said 
nothing about post-judgment interest even though trial court must 
have concluded that Hawaii law governed that rate as well). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' brief demonstrates that this Court should 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment as 
follows: Plaintiffs should be awarded judgment in the amount of 
$129,057.73. No prejudgment interest should be included. Post-
judgment interest at the prescribed Utah statutory rate of twelve 
percent per annum should accrue from the date of entry of this 
Court' s judgment. 
Any award in excess of the amount urged here could only 
be based on a misinterpretation of the contract language 
governing S&W s recovery, dubious legal theories substituted for 
that contract language, acceptance of an unsupported equitable 
argument that Fireman' s Fund is entitled to the contract balance 
on a job completed and paid for by Cyprus, and misinterpretations 
of the legal standards governing prejudgment and post-judgment 
interest. 
-1 Q-
DATED this /ffA day of October, 1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Kenneth W. Yeates 
Phyllis J. Vetter 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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Challis, Idaho 83226 
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CO 
Re: Claim No, HI' 
Bond No, SC 
Principal^ : $*~ir*ff Const. Co. of Tennessee, Inc. 
Obligee: " Cyprus-Thompson Creek Mining Company 
Project: Cyprus-Thompson Creek Phases 7, 12 & 17 
Dear Mr. Misclevitz: 
Fireman's Fund hereby makes a demand for the balance 
of approximately $300,000 in the captioned project. This 
demand is based upon an agreement between Fireman1s Fund 
and Cyprus-Thompson Creek Mining Company in June 1983 which 
is embodied in letters dated June 24*, 1983 and June 29, 1983 
between Cyprus-Thompson Creek Mining Company and Fireman's 
Fund, copies of which are enclosed. 
You will note that on page 2 of the June 24 letter 
Fireman's Fund requests in paragraph (i) that "all the 
contract balances less completion costs incurred by Mcrriscn-
Knudsen Company shall be paid to Fireman's Fund." In response, 
on page 2 of the June 29 letter Cyprus-Thompson Creek states 
that "prior to the release of any S & W funds we would require 
thac Fireman's Fund provide us a document that holds Cyprus 
Thompson Creek and Morrison-Knudsen harmless frcrz any sub-
sequent claims from these funds." 
Pursuant to the request in the June 29 letter, Fire-
man's Fund hereby agrees to hold Cyprus-Thompson Creek Mining 
Company and Morrison-Knudsen harmless from any subsequent 
claims for these funds. Fireman's Fund hereby requests that 
these funds be paid to it immediately. 




Denton M. Hatch 
Attorney for Fireman's Fund 
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